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Introduction: In economic theory economic surplus refers to two related quantities: Con-
sumer and producer surplus. Applying this theory to health care “convenience” could be
one way how consumer benefits might manifest itself.
Methods: Various areas of economic surplus were identified and subsequently screened
and analyzed in Germany, Spain,The Netherlands, and the UK: Cesarean births, emergency
room visits (nights or weekends), drug availability after test results, and response surplus.
A targeted literature search was being conducted to identify the associated costs. Finally
the economic surplus (convenience value) was calculated.
Results: The economic surplus for different health care areas was being calculated. The
highest economic surplus was obtained for the example of response surplus IVF-treatments
in The Netherlands.
Conclusion: The analyzed examples in this article support the underlying hypothesis for
this research: “Value of convenience defined as the consumer surplus in health care can
be shown in different health care settings.” Again, this hypothesis should be accepted
as a starting point in this research area and hence further primary research is strongly
recommended in order to fully proof this concept.
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HEALTH CARE MARKET: AN INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the introduction of new innovative medicinal
products has become increasingly difficult as a result of the budget
pressure, the introduction of more complicated procedures and
higher demands on added value of medicinal products and other
therapies. For the most part, those measures have relied on bud-
geting or price controls, including negotiated prospective budgets
for hospitals, centralized negotiated budgets for ambulatory physi-
cians including drug prescriptions, and limitations on payments
for particular medications. Autonomous behavior by prescribers
is restricted to follow national clinical guidelines, local formularies
and/or local agreements between prescribers and health insurers,
who sanction on deviant prescription behavior or reward proper
prescription behavior. Though every country in Europe has its
own specific cost containment measures and hurdles for market
access, the changes have a similar impact on each new medici-
nal product introduction in Europe: more and more refusal or
restrictive access to new therapies following negative reimburse-
ment decisions. Because those traditional central cost containment
measures were only partially successful, due to lack of incentives,
the health authorities in Europe started to establish incentives
for efficient health care delivery. Although there is large variety
between the various countries, there are two related trends: the
implementation of market mechanisms and decentralization of
the health care decision-making process (Nuijten et al., 2011). The
aim of those reforms is to control increasing health care costs,
which has become an important part of the collective economic
burden.
CONCEPT OF CONVENIENCE
In Webster’s Dictionary (Report of the Consumer Healthcare
Products Association’s Clinical/Medical Committee, 2010), conve-
nience is defined as “anything that adds to one’s comfort or saves
work; useful, handy, or helpful device, article, service, etc.” Vari-
ous conceptual frameworks for convenience have been developed
(Report of the Consumer Healthcare Products Association’s Clini-
cal/Medical Committee, 2010). In general, all of these frameworks
address the time and energy or effort consumers spend deciding
on, accessing, transacting for, and benefiting from a product or
service.
Convenience in health care could also be linked to a strong
microeconomic basis, the theory of economic surplus (Zweifel
et al., 2009). In economic theory economic surplus refers to two
related quantities:
◦ Consumer surplus which is the monetary gain obtained by
consumers because they are able to purchase a product for a
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price that is less than the highest price they would be willing
to pay.
◦ Producer surplus which is the amount that producers benefit by
selling at a market price that is higher than the least they would
be willing to sell for.
On a standard supply and demand diagram, consumer surplus is
the area above the equilibrium price of the good and below the
demand curve. This reflects the fact that consumers would have
been willing to buy a single unit of the good at a price higher
than the equilibrium price, a second unit at a price below that but
still above the equilibrium price, etc., yet they in fact pay just the
equilibrium price for each unit they buy.
Likewise, in the supply-demand diagram, producer surplus is
the area below the equilibrium price but above the supply curve.
This reflects the fact that producers would have been willing to
supply the first unit at a price lower than the equilibrium price,
the second unit at a price above that but still below the equilibrium
price, etc., yet they in fact receive the equilibrium price for all the
units they sell.
Even though that health care markets are normally being
defined as imperfect markets due to different specifications of
it (e.g., moral hazard problem) the theory of economic surplus
can still be applied (Cabral, 2002; Zweifel et al., 2009). In standard
microeconomic text books it is well described that consumer (and
producer) surpluses can be shown in any market. Just the value
a consumer or producer can skim might be different due to the
underlying market mechanisms.
Applying the theory to health care, “convenience” could be one
way how consumer benefits might manifest itself. We have ana-
lyzed the existence of microeconomic surpluses in different health
care areas in Germany, Spain, The Netherlands, and the UK.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
The underlying hypothesis for this research was as follows: “Value
of convenience defined as the consumer surplus in health care
can be shown in different health care settings.” As this hypothe-
sis is a starting point in this research area the analysis have been
solely based on published literature and otherwise publicly avail-
able information. Further primary research might be needed in
order to proof the concept.
In order to get an overview of existing convenience areas in
healthcare a targeted literature search in standard databases for
medical and economic literature was being conducted: PubMed,
Medline, EconLibrary, and EconLit. Furthermore a general search
in the internet using Google was applied. Keywords being used
were: microeconomics, convenience, health care, economic sur-
plus, microeconomic surplus, patient surplus. As a result there was
basically no manuscript available analyzing convenience in health-
care as an example of microeconomic surplus. Subsequently we
have conducted a review of healthcare systems using the following
approach in order to identify different areas of potential conve-
nience in the systems. Different exemplary treatments, processes,
or services a healthcare system delivers to patients were defined.
• Cesarean births: A reason for discussion of this area is the
increased incidence of cesarean births in the developed markets
without an increased medical need (Robson et al., 2009).
• Emergency room visits during nights and weekends are also a
potential area of convenience in the system as the cost are gen-
erally higher for the service provider (hospital) but the payment
for the service is the same as during “normal” working hours.
• Drug availability after test results: Personalized healthcare is one
of the key areas for all healthcare stakeholders and hence we have
also discussed the potential availability of convenience for indi-
cations where a drug treatment is just available after a positive
test result.
• Response surplus with the example of In vitro fertilization
(IVF)-treatment: For some treatments payers restrict their pay-
ment to a maximum number of treatment cycles. In the case of
infertility IVF-treatments are normally fully reimbursed (med-
ication, procedures, and consultations) for 2–3 cycles depending
on the insurance and health care system.
After the identification of the areas to be analyzed a targeted
payment and cost search was conducted in order to link the dif-
ferent medical examples with costs and/or reimbursement tariffs
dependent on the purpose of the chosen example. In order to get a
European overview of convenience areas, different examples were
taken from different countries: Cesarean births were analyzed in
Germany, emergency room visits in the UK, drug availability after
test results in Spain, and the response surplus example in The
Netherlands.
RESULTS
CESAREAN BIRTHS
Robson et al. (2009) report that the rate of cesarean section in
Australia now exceeds 30% and evidence from population stud-
ies indicates that maternal requests for elective cesarean delivery
might make an important contribution. In an anonymous survey
they have analyzed 1,239 specialist obstetricians and 317 obstetric
specialty trainees in Australia and came to the conclusions that “at
least 17% of all elective cesarean sections, and slightly more than
3% of all births”were being done on request by the patient without
a clear medical indication. This evidence is probably also seen in
other developed markets.
We have used the German market to analyze the potential eco-
nomic surplus. For the hypothetical analyses below it is especially
assumed that a woman could also change her preference from a
vaginal birth to a cesarean during the actual process of the birth
without a medical need. The difference of a Diagnosis Related
Groups (DRG) for a vaginal birth and a Cesarean birth in Ger-
many was calculated (see Table 1). The base rate fee of C2’800 was
multiplied by the DRG value which resulted in the actual DRG
value for the two analyzed DRGs. This difference (C828 per case)
represents the average financial burden per single non-medical dri-
ven Cesarean birth covered by the insurer. According to the theory
the microeconomic surplus for the respective patient, however, is
represented by the difference of the potential willingness to pay for
a non-medical driven Cesarean birth and the co-payment. Will-
ingness to pay was not elicited through experiments which would
obviously be a better (although still imperfect) way to quantify the
consumer surplus, which the patients are collectively gathering as a
result of the too low market price of their healthcare consumption.
In the absence of this value for willingness to pay, we quantified
the producer surplus in a simplistic way, as we were looking at the
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Table 1 | DRGs in Germany for vaginal and cesarean births without
complications.
DRG Description Relation to
base rate fee
Mean stay in
hospital (days)
O01H Primary section cesarean
without complications,
pregnancy duration of more
than 33 weeks, without
complex diagnosis
0.803 4.8
O60D Vaginal birth without
complications
0.507 3.3
incremental reimbursement (revenue) for the provider, without
looking at the collective incremental costs for Cesarean vs. vaginal
delivery. It is probably fair to assume that the (individual) pro-
ducer surplus per provider will not amount to the entire C828
per case.
EMERGENCY ROOM VISITS
Emergency room visits during nights and weekends have been
identified as a potential area of convenience in the healthcare
system as the actual cost for the service provider (hospital) are
generally higher due to higher salaries but the payment (and hence
reimbursement or DRG) for the service is the same as during“nor-
mal” working hours. For the analysis of potential surpluses in the
system nurses working in the emergency rooms in the United King-
dom were chosen. Nurse salaries are published by the National
Health Service (NHS; UK Salary and Taxation, 2012). For this
hypothetical analysis it was assumed that experienced nurses will
work in emergency rooms and hence a nurse grade E (experienced
nurse staff) was chosen for the analysis. As less experienced nurses
have a smaller salary, the consumer surplus calculated below would
then also be reduced. The annual salary of a grade E nurse can
vary from £17′660 to £21′325 whereas a median salary of £19′492
was assumed. Furthermore it was assumed that all other costs to
deliver an emergency room service were independent of the time
of delivery of the service (day or night shift). In order to have all
analysis in this paper in C an exchange rate of 0.8 was assumed
(C1= £0.8). According to the NHS nurses receive a salary pre-
mium of 30% for night times and 60% for weekends (D’Addario
et al., 2010). A standard Healthcare Resource Group (HRG) value
for an emergency visit was applied and the theoretical surplus was
calculated applying a proxy-add-on taken from the proportion-
ally higher wages during premium times and was ranging between
C30 and C60 per case per day for nights shifts and weekends
respectively. A summary table with the key assumptions is pro-
vided in Table 2. The microeconomic surplus for the patients relies
on the fact that emergency room services may be seen as reserve
capacities. Such reserve capacities are characterized by non-rivalry
and non-excludability making them so-called public goods, whose
supply usually relies on a specific public intervention.
DRUG AVAILABILITY AFTER TEST RESULTS
Non-small cell lung cancer (NSCLC) accounts for∼85–90% of all
lung cancers (D’Addario et al., 2010). It is biologically aggressive
and the leading cause of cancer death in men and women. A bio-
logical and genetical variation of lung cancer is NSCLC which
bears activating mutations in the tyrosine kinase domain of the
epidermal growth factor receptor (EGFR). Exon 19 deletions and
the L858R mutation constitute ∼90% of the EGFR mutations
identified to date. EGFR MuT+ lead to structural changes, which
stabilize the active form of the tyrosine kinase domain and result in
a high affinity for binding EGFR tyrosine kinase inhibitors (TKIs;
Carey et al., 2006). In patients with tumors that are positive for
these mutations, the current data supports sensitivity to gefitinib
or erlotinib (NCCN Practice Guidelines in Oncology, 2012a,b). As
both therapies are approved by the European Medicines Agency
(EMA) since a couple of years [European Medicine Agency (EMA)
(2012a,b)] and most health care systems also approved its pricing
and reimbursement one could assume that also the EGFR m+
test would be reimbursed by those payer authorities. However
as an example in Spain those tests are not officially reimbursed.
Until recently Astra Zeneca has paid for the test which cost around
C350 per patient. This amount could also be assumed to be the
surplus for the Spanish NHS as neither of the two drug ther-
apies will be reimbursed if no positive test result is available.
This could be a quite high amount as both therapies cost around
C2′000 per pack (Consejo General de Colegios Oficiales de Far-
macéuticos, 2012). The microeconomic surplus is more difficult
to determine: From the perspective of Astra Zeneca, for example,
the drug gefitinib is still under patent protection making monop-
oly pricing possible. Accordingly, paying for the tests may be seen
as an investment that should be overwhelmed by monopoly rents
due to additional gefitinib sales. The economic surplus of patients
would again be represented by the difference between their will-
ingness to pay for the additional medication (including tests) and
their co-payments. Unfortunately the actual willingness to pay per
patient is not known. The costs of the additional gefitinib sales,
however, need to be covered by the insurer. In total those costs and
hence the microeconomic surplus could be as high as C24′000
per patient assuming a treatment duration of 12 months for such
patients.
RESPONSE SURPLUS FOR IVF-TREATMENT
In vitro fertilization is a process by which an egg is fertilized by
sperm outside the body: in vitro. IVF is a major treatment for
infertility when other methods of assisted reproductive technology
have failed (National Collaborating Centre for Women’s and Chil-
dren’s Health, 2004). IVF success rates are the percentage of all IVF
procedures which result in a favorable outcome. Depending on the
type of calculation used, this outcome may represent the number
of confirmed pregnancies, called the pregnancy rate or number
of live births, called the live birth rate. Due to advancement in
reproductive technology, the IVF success rates are substantially
better today than they were just a few years ago. The most current
data available in the United States is a 2009 summary complied
by the Society for Reproductive Medicine (SART) which reports
the average national IVF success rates per age group using non-
donor eggs (see Table 3 below; Assisted Reproductive Technology,
2009).
The live birth rates using donor eggs are also given by the
SART and include all age groups using either fresh or thawed
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Table 2 | Summary of key assumptions in the example of emergency room visits in the UK.
Convenience
area
Country Assumption/calculation
definition
Calculation Results: Microeconomic
surplus
Emergency
room visits
UK Annual salary of nurse grade E (specialist
nurse): £19′492
Exchange rate: C1=£0.81
Salary premiums for nights: 30%
Salary premiums for weekends: 60%
Cost coverage from daily salary
for one emergency visit was
calculated and compared
between a “normal,” night and
weekend shift
C30 surplus (night shifts)
C60 surplus (weekends)
Standard HRG (emergency visit): £75
Table 3 | Pregnancy and live birth rates according to different age
groups for IVF-treatment (Assisted ReproductiveTechnology, 2009).
<35 year 35–37 years 38–40 years 41–42 years
Pregnancy rate 47.6 38.9 30.1 20.5
Live birth rate 41.4 31.7 22.3 12.6
eggs. The live birth rates with fresh donor egg embryos is 55.1 and
with thawed donor egg embryos it is 33.8 (Assisted Reproductive
Technology, 2009).
Normally the success rates for IVF-treatment in women where
an initial treatment failed is dramatically lower than in other
women. For simplicity reasons this is not covered within this
analysis.
In most countries the reimbursement of IVF-treatment is lim-
ited to a maximum number of treatments. For example in The
Netherlands three IVF–treatments are fully reimbursed (medica-
tion, procedures, and consultations) per ongoing pregnancy and
another three after pregnancy (Fiddelers et al., 2009). When an
initial IVF-treatment has failed, patients may pay for this initial
phase by themselves in order to save one full IVF-treatment.
For the analysis it was assumed that 21.4% of IVF treated
patients will be successful and hence lead to a pregnancy. Again,
the microeconomic surplus for the respective patient is repre-
sented by the difference between the willingness to pay for IVF-
treatments and their co-payment. As no other willingness-to-pay
data are available the following results of a US-survey are taken
into account for illustrative purposes: According to a US-survey
among 150 potential childbearers, for example, the average will-
ingness to pay was $17,730 (in 1992 dollars) for a 10% chance at
having a child through IVF in the event of infertility (Neumann
and Johannesson, 1994). In contrast, the list price for each IVF-
treatment in the Netherlands is C2′048. So a maximum of C4′096
could be saved if physicians after one first successful attempt in a
woman use the two remaining attempts for another woman, who
failed three times.
The above mentioned examples support the underlying
hypothesis for this research (“Value of convenience defined as
the consumer surplus in health care can be shown in different
health care settings”). Again, this hypothesis should be accepted
as a starting point in this research area and hence further pri-
mary research is strongly recommended in order to fully proof
this concept.
DISCUSSION
In health care we face very acute information problems, which
make rational purchasing decisions difficult (Zweifel et al., 2009).
For most products outside of health care the buyer of a prod-
uct is also the one who receives the benefits of a product. This
is clearly different to the situation in health care where in most
countries those who pay are not the receivers of health care
(patients). In addition, patients are faced with imperfect infor-
mation regarding the quality of the health service they con-
sume. In contrast to other services, there is a lack of possi-
bility of the random sample. Whenever externalities occur, we
may have market failure if not remedied by taxes or subsi-
dies or some “Coasian” solution to the problem (Zweifel et al.,
2009).
Another issue which might have had affected our findings
is asymmetry of information (Zweifel et al., 2009). The con-
sumer, the patient, has an unclear knowledge about their current
disease stage and well-being. Just take the example of cesarean
births: The patient has unclear knowledge about her medical
well-being, but probably some preferences regarding vaginal- and
cesarean births. The treating physician, however, has some bet-
ter knowledge about the status due to his academic background
and experience, whereas the institution paying for the cesarean
birth only gets the claims and pays. The asymmetry of informa-
tion between physician and patient has become much smaller,
because the patient has become more knowledgeable than in
the past by means of better education and media. The Internet
offers (e.g., on-line patient communities) opportunities to further
reduce this knowledge gap. However the increasing complexity
of medical diagnosis and procedures available make obtaining
accurate knowledge difficult. In addition genetic engineering tech-
nology may further increase the information gap both for patients
as well as physicians vs. providers of those products or related
services.
In a pure market economy supply and demand are deter-
mined by individual firms and consumers and it is the price of
the commodity, which brings demand and supply into balance or
equilibrium (Figure 1). The economic model of consumer behav-
ior assumes that the consumer attempts to use his/her income
in order to obtain maximum well-being or utility (consumer as
maximizer) by purchasing a basket of goods and services sub-
ject to available income. It assumes that consumers know how
best to increase their own welfare and therefore which goods to
choose. Information is readily available on their characteristics
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FIGURE 1 | Consumer and producer surplus in a supply-demand
diagram.
and these can be related to the individual’s preferences. In health
care markets, patients do not pay directly for treatment which
might be accompanied with the problem of over-consumption
due to moral hazard. Consequently the price of a health care ser-
vice will not bring demand and supply into balance: The demand
by the patient will not be limited by the price, and providers might
have financial incentives to increase the volume of health care
services. The third party, the health insurer, who is responsible
for direct payment, may have some control over price, but to a
much less extent on volume. A health insurance company can pass
on the cost of this excess expenditure through increased contri-
butions. The problem of patient moral hazard is compounded
where providers are also given incentives to overtreat patients,
especially if high reimbursements are expected. In this case nei-
ther the patient nor the provider has an incentive to contain costs.
To counter this problem the literature suggests two alternative
strategies: (1) the insurer may impose demand-side cost shar-
ing by requiring the patient to share in the cost of treatment,
and/or (2) supply-side cost sharing which seeks to alter the incen-
tives to health care providers to provide certain services (Ellis and
McGuire, 1993). Capping the overall reimbursement per patient
and quarter, like it is practice for self-employed ambulatory care
physicians in Germany, may act as an example for supply-side cost
sharing.
Given the imperfection of the health care market there might
still be the discussion if consumer and producer surpluses can be
applied. However, even if there is monopoly and uniform pric-
ing, there remains a consumer surplus. In order to completely
extract the consumer surplus there needs to be perfect price dis-
crimination. Even if there are many suppliers offering different
contracts (multi-part tariffs and different qualities), they will typ-
ically not be able to extract the entire consumer surplus in health
care (Cabral, 2002). What about the producer surplus? If the
supply (marginal cost) curve is more or less horizontal, there is
no producer surplus. If competition is fierce one would expect
the producer surplus being small. Similarly, if those purchasing
health services are good negotiators (good at designing contracts),
the contracts should be such that suppliers only earn a normal
profit (i.e., don’t earn excess profits); they have to supply excellent
quality without making extranormal profits. If suppliers earn a
producer surplus there might be the possibility of underestimat-
ing (or providing a lower bound for) the social surplus (Cabral,
2002).
Different limitations directly apply to the simplistic examples:
For the UK calculations a lot of assumptions have been taken into
account for which some are quite strict: The cost of a HRG not
clearly be defined: how can we compare the annual (daily) cost
for one nurse with the revenue that hospital is getting through
the HRGs, if we do not know how many patients are visiting the
emergency room on average per day? Of course there might be
more patients being administered during days than during nights,
on the other hand there might also be more staff in the emer-
gency unit during days than during nights. Anyhow, for simplicity
and a theoretical calculation we assumed that the revenue from
one HRG can be compared with the cost per nurse even though
that one nurse might be able to treat more than one patient per
day. This discussion strongly suggests further research in this area
including a primary research component including potentially a
micro costing approach.
Limitations of this research include the simplicity of the analy-
ses and the secondary research nature of it. However, the purpose
of this work was to analyze the existence of convenience in health
care from a conceptual perspective based on a strong economic
theory. To the best of our knowledge there are currently no similar
research results available. Hopefully, the work published in this
research paper will initiate further theoretical as well as empirical
studies.
CONCLUSION
The analyzed examples in this article support the underlying
hypothesis for this research: “Value of convenience defined as
the consumer surplus in health care can be shown in different
health care settings.” Again, this hypothesis should be accepted
as a starting point in this research area and hence further pri-
mary research is strongly recommended in order to fully proof
this concept.
KEY POINTS FOR DECISION MAKERS
• The analyzed examples in this article support the underlying
hypothesis for this research: “Value of convenience defined as
the consumer surplus in health care can be shown in different
health care settings.”
• To the best of our knowledge there are currently no similar
research results available.
• The work published in this research paper should initiate further
theoretical as well as empirical studies.
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